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“Mr. Chairman, exemption from taxes is a privilege for which 
communities have a right to expect a measureable definable benefit. Given 
the value of the exemption and the cost of it to every level of government, it 
makes sense that we scrutinize the extent to which communities are receiving 
a return on their investment in not-for-profit hospitals.” – Bill Thomas, The 
Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, Hearing before the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, May 2005.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Introduction 
Many academics have addressed community benefit, and many have 
drawn various conclusions: community benefit is a failure;2 community 
benefit is vague;3 community benefit lacks comparable quantifiable 
information;4 community benefit is ineffective.5 These are the common 
refrains of fellow law students and academics contemplating the oft-
confusing world of community benefit for tax-exempt hospitals, and to a 
certain extent, they are all correct. Since 1969, the standard has provided 
considerable wiggle room for organizational compliance of § 501(c)(3) 
requirements,6 but media attention circa 20047 proved the topic was ripe 
for Congressional interest,8 which culminated in the Patient Protection and 
 
 1. The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
109th Cong. 7 (2005) [hereinafter Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector] (statement of Bill Thomas, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & Means) (quoting from past historical Congressional inquiries 
into entities exempt from federal taxes). 
 2. John D. Colombo, The Failure of Community Benefit, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 29, 29 
(2005). 
 3. Amanda W. Thai, Is Senator Grassley Our Savior?: The Crusade against “Charitable” 
Hospitals Attacking Patients for Unpaid Bills, 96 IOWA L. REV. 761, 768 (2011) (citing Michele 
R. Goodman, Putting the Community Back in Community Benefit: Proposed State Exemption 
Standard for Nonprofit Hospitals, 84 IND. L.J. 713, 728 (2009)). 
 4. Jessica Berg, Putting the Community Back into the “Community Benefit” Standard, 44 
GA. L. REV. 375, 388 (2010) (citing J.B. SILVERS, COSTS IN HEALTHCARE & THE CASE OF 
UNCOMPENSATED CARE 2 (Jan. 2007) (draft report for National Health Policy Forum) (on file 
with author)). 
 5. Laura L. Folkerts, Do Nonprofit Hospitals Provide Community Benefit? A Critique of 
the Standards for Proving Deservedness of Federal Tax Exemptions, 34 J. CORP. L. 611, 640 
(2009). 
 6. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (1969), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-tege/rr69-545.pdf. 
 7. See Tom Scheck, How Much Charity is Too Much? MINN. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 13, 
2004), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2004/12/13_scheckt_suit. 
 8. See Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 1, at 1. See Taking the Pulse of 
Charitable Care and Community Benefits at Nonprofit Hospitals: Hearing before the S. Comm. 
on Fin., 109th Cong. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Taking the Pulse of Charitable Care]; STAFF OF S. 
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Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) under § 9007, “Additional 
Requirements for Charitable Hospitals,” and amendments to § 501 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (the Code).9 
Newly added § 501(r) outlines four new requirements for hospitals to 
meet in order to comply with community benefit, which will be termed 
“community benefit redux”10 for purposes of this Comment. The 
“Community Health Needs Assessment” (CHNA), the mantelpiece of reform, 
allows hospitals to identify a health need in the community and implement a 
strategy designed to overcome its findings (§ 501(r)(3)).11 The CHNA is 
accompanied by § 501(r)(4)’s financial assistance and emergency medical 
care policies (FAP and EMC, respectively), in addition to limitations on 
charges (§ 501(r)(5)) and prohibitions against extraordinary collection 
actions for FAP-eligible patients (§ 501(r)(6)).12 In short, the new § 501(r) 
provisions are meant to overcome some of the community benefit criticisms 
identified at the beginning of this Comment. 
Yet the § 501(r) additions are nothing more than superficial misdirection 
from community benefit’s existing issues. This Comment’s thesis is that the 
sections lack genuine substance because the ACA § 9007 components are 
overly prescriptive,13 implement an “intermediate sanction”14 with widely 
disparate impacts on rural community hospitals,15 and, most importantly, 
may be wholly unworkable in practice due to the inherent difficulties in 
quantifying, evaluating, and analyzing data collected under the CHNA.16 
Furthermore, § 501(r)’s attempt at reform forces hospitals to codify existing 
 
COMM. ON FIN. – MINORITY, 110TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT HOSPITALS: DISCUSSION DRAFT (Comm. 
Print 2007), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/releases/2007/07182007.pdf. See 
also Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Releases Staff Discussion Draft of Potential 
Non-profit Hospital Reforms, Solicits Public Comment (July 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=5202. 
 9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007, 124 Stat. 
855-858 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA]. 
 10. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 35, 37, 40, 42-44 (acknowledgement is required for 
Professor Colombo’s use of the term “community benefit plus” and “promotion of health plus” 
as it served as the template for “community benefit redux” as utilized in this Comment); ACA § 
9007. 
 11. ACA § 9007; Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. 38148, 
38148 (proposed June 26, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 12. ACA § 9007; Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. 38148 
at 38148-49. 
 13. Letter from the Am. Hosp. Ass’n to the Internal Revenue Serv. (Oct. 12, 2012), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=IRS-2012-0036-0196 
(arguing that the proposed regulations issued by the IRS are too prescriptive and overly 
burdensome for hospitals). 
 14. See Berg, supra note 4, at 405-07. 
 15. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 51. 
 16. See Berg, supra note 4, at 412-18. 
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practices under federal legislation, keeps financially strapped individuals 
among the highest paying hospital patients,17 and prohibits contemporary 
collection actions only constrained by a facility’s own definition of what 
constitutes FAP-eligibility.18 
This Comment suggests the lack of reform embodied in ACA § 9007’s 
changes to the Code are largely based on a framework for meaningful 
community benefit changes presented in Professor Jessica Berg’s Putting the 
Community Back into the “Community Benefit” Standard, a pre-ACA article 
exploring the potential benefits of implementing a public health focus in the 
community benefit arena.19 Based on Berg’s framework, this Comment 
argues that § 501(r) wholly misses the mark.20 Echoing similar academics’ 
ruminations on the all too frequent community benefit analysis in the 
literature, the ACA’s changes are an adequate start to addressing the oft-
criticized community benefit standard,21 but is likely only an intermediate 
step between the standard’s contemporary state and a complete overhaul 
within the next five to ten years. 
B. Comment Overview 
This Comment seeks to provide relevant background on ACA § 9007, 
the amendments to § 501 of the Code, and historic standards of federal 
tax-exempt status and offers an argument for why “community benefit redux” 
is merely an incremental step toward meaningful reform.22 Part II, “History 
and Background of Charitable Hospitals and Tax-Exempt Status,” briefly 
outlines the roots of charitable hospitals with a nod to Paul Starr’s seminal 
work in the health law field.23 It next segues into historic standards for 
federal tax-exemption as interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),24 
including IRS Revenue Rulings (Rev. Rul.) 56-185 (1956) and 69-545 
(1969), which established the charity care and community benefit standards, 
 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
 18. See infra Part V.C. 
 19. Berg, supra note 4, at 402-21. 
 20. See infra Part VI. 
 21. Daniel B. Rubin et al., Evaluating Hospitals’ Provision of Community Benefit: An 
Argument for an Outcome-Based Approach to Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption, AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH e1, e4 (2013) (published online ahead of print, Feb. 14, 2013), available at 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2012.301048. 
 22. See infra Part II. See also Berg, supra note 4, at 419-21 (noting that, “[d]espite these 
potential problems, refocusing community benefit on population health benefit is at least a 
step in the right direction”). 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See infra Part II.B-C. 
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respectively.25 Both will be discussed with their respective impacts on United 
States charitable care and charitable hospitals.26 
Parts III and IV introduce the “community benefit redux” additions to § 
501(r) of the Code, focusing on the CHNA under § 501(r)(3) and analyzing 
the section utilizing Professor Berg’s framework for meaningful reform as 
presented in her 2010 article.27 Lastly, the Comment ends with Part VI and 
contemplates ACA § 9007’s addition of § 501(r) to the Code in the context 
of the preceding arguments on the community benefit redux’s complete lack 
of substance as a result of conclusions drawn from Professor Berg’s 
framework and applicable analysis.28 Part V explores potential limitations of 
the additional subsections of § 501(r). 
II.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF CHARITABLE HOSPITALS 
AND TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 
A. United States Charitable Hospitals 
Charitable hospitals with religious affiliations in the nineteenth century 
provided healthcare for individuals who lacked the traditional framework of 
social support of family and friends, and this altruistic mission remains a 
core tenet of contemporary tax-exempt charitable hospitals.29 These 
organizations can trace their origins to the nineteenth century where these 
“voluntary hospitals,”30 which were traditionally characterized by religious 
affiliations, relied heavily on philanthropy, and the unreimbursed labor of 
skilled physicians and nurses.31 Charitable hospitals provided healthcare to 
the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder;32 they were a far cry from the 
pristine complete organizations associated with competent healthcare 
delivery today.33 The charitable nature of these voluntary religious-affiliated 
organizations that was present in their origins has survived as the hospitals 
 
 25. See infra Part II.B-C. 
 26. See infra Part II.C-D. 
 27. See infra Part III, Part IV.B, Part V.A-C. 
 28. See infra Part VI. 
 29. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A 
SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 149 (5th ed. 1982) (noting the 
historical roots of hospitals as having a “strong communal character”). 
 30. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: 
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH L. REV. 307, 318 (1991) (providing a 
history of non-profit hospitals in America and their affiliation with religious societies). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id.; STARR, supra note 29, at 150-51 (citing LEONARD K. EATON, NEW ENGLAND 
HOSPITALS, 1790-1837 (Univ. of Mich. 1957)). 
 33. See STARR, supra note 29, at 430 (discussing that in the 1980s approximately 180 
hospital systems operated nearly 294,199 hospital beds). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
454 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 7:449 
evolved with the changing of healthcare.34 During World War II, wage 
freezes caused employers to find alternative methods to compete for labor.35 
One method became offering health insurance to employees, which led to 
the proliferation of United States health insurance, and the tax-exempt 
hospitals saw payments from patients previously unable to pay.36 With a little 
reimbursement from landmark legislation in the mid-1960s from Medicare 
and Medicaid, charitable hospitals partially survived as a result of increasing 
reimbursement from their patient population.37 
B. Charitable Hospitals, the Internal Revenue Service, and § 501(c)(3) 
Charitable hospitals are considered tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the 
Code, although the section of the United States Code (U.S.C.) does not 
specifically mention hospitals as tax-exempt.38 The section reads: 
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition . . ., or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures 
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial 
part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
office.39 
Legally, hospitals are recognized to qualify as “organized and operated 
exclusively for religious [or] charitable”40 purposes as long as “no part of the 
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
 
 34. Hall & Colombo, supra note 30, at 319. See also STARR, supra note 29, at 149-50. 
 35. STARR, supra note 29, at 310-11. See also Frank R. Dobbin, The Origins of Private 
Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in America, 1920-1950, 97 AM. J. OF SOC., 
1416, 1418-19 (Mar. 1992) (discussing wage freezes during WWII and the impact on 
healthcare). 
 36. STARR, supra note 29, at 310-11. 
 37. Id. See also Hall & Colombo, supra note 30, at 320 (noting that exempt hospitals 
became worried of the existing charity care standard for tax-exemption, underscoring the 
importance and implications of the Medicare and Medicaid programs). 
 38. See Exemption from Tax Corporations, Certain Trusts, etc., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) 
(2012) (which does not specifically mention hospitals under 501(c)(3), although they are 
traditionally considered exempt under this provision of the Code). 
 39. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 40. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] COMMUNITY BENEFIT 501(R)EDUX 455 
individual.”41 Generally, charitable hospitals must be organized for 
charitable purposes, as present in their articles of incorporation, and also 
operate in order to achieve that goal;42 two tests are often referred to as the 
organizational and operational tests of federal tax-exemption.43 In order to 
qualify as a § 501(c)(3) organization, charitable hospitals have historically 
been subject to different historical standards, including the charity care 
standard (1956),44 the community benefit standard (1969),45 and most 
recently the amended § 501(r) of the Code as added by § 9007 of the ACA, 
which includes four additional requirements for nonprofit hospitals to follow 
in order to be recognized as tax-exempt.46 For purposes of this Comment, 
the new § 501(r) standards will be recognized as “community benefit redux,” 
a title inspired by the Third Circuit’s term “community benefit plus,” as 
discussed in IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner, in addition to John D. 
Colombo’s discussion of the term in Failure of Community Benefit.47 
C. IRS Revenue Ruling 56-185 and the Charity Care Standard 
Released in 1956, IRS Rev. Rul. 56-185 established the charity care 
standard for charitable hospitals, and noted “[t]he only ground upon which 
a hospital may be held to be exempt . . . is that it is organized and operated 
primarily for educational, scientific, or public charitable purposes.”48 The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of “charitable” in Helvering v. Susan D. Bliss 
et al.,49 prompted the IRS to take “the position that the term ‘charitable’ in 
its legal sense and as it is used in section § 501(c)(3) of the Code 
contemplates an implied public trust constituted for some public benefit, the 
 
 41. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). See also THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE 
LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 6 (John Wiley & Sons eds., 3d ed. 2008). 
 42. BARRY A. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 977 (Thomson 
West, 6th ed. 2008). 
 43. Id. See also Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 113 T.C. 47, 
71 (1999); Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 242 F.3d 904, 904 
(2001). 
 44. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (1956). 
 45. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (1969). 
 46. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38148; ACA § 
9007. It should be noted that the varying standards applied to determine tax-exempt status for 
charitable healthcare organizations, including charity care, community benefit, and the most 
recent “community benefit redux,” are considered in concert to determine whether an 
organization qualifies. The most recent requirements did not supplant the historical 
requirements for tax-exempt status. 
 47. Colombo, supra note 2, at 35, 37, 40, 42-44. Acknowledgement is required for 
Professor Colombo’s use of the term “community benefit plus” and “promotion of health plus” 
as it served as the template for “community benefit redux” as utilized in this Comment. Id. 
 48. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (1956). 
 49. 293 U.S. 144, 150 (1934). 
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income . . . of which may not inure to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual.”50 Thus, as long as the hospital provided care to the poor and 
those unable to pay to the extent of its financial ability, it was viewed as 
meeting the charity care standard.51 
D. IRS Revenue Ruling 69-545 and the Community Benefit Standard 
But the charity care standard to qualify experienced increasing scrutiny 
between 1956 and the latter part of the next decade.52 Medicare and 
Medicaid provided federal dollars for healthcare of the aged and poor, 
respectively, and forced the IRS to reconsider the charity care standard.53 
This was partially due to increasing anxiety from healthcare institutions 
concerned about meeting the standard in concert with the new Medicare 
and Medicaid programs.54 In response, the IRS released Rev. Rul. 69-545 in 
1969, which introduced the enigma of community benefit for qualification 
of tax-exempt healthcare organizations.55 Although the IRS introduced the 
community benefit standard in 1969, IRS Rev. Rul. 56-185: 
was not repealed when the community benefit standard was adopted. Rev. 
Rul. 69-545 did not revoke Rev. Rul. 56-185; it merely modified it. While a 
hospital is no longer required to operate to the extent of its financial ability 
for those not able to pay, doing so is a major factor indicating that a 
hospital is operated for the benefit of the community.56 
Thus, the community benefit standard did not supplant the original charity 
care standard, but was introduced as an additional option for tax-exempt 
hospitals to fulfill their requirements to qualify for tax-exempt status.57 
 
 50. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (1956). 
 51. The Concept of Charity, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 1980, 4 (1980), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb80.pdf (noting 
“Rev. Rul. 56-185 . . . reflected the traditional approach in that exemption was allowed only if 
the health care provider was ‘operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to 
pay for the services rendered and not exclusively for those who are able and expected to 
pay”). 
 52. Colombo, supra note 2, at 30-31 (noting that “[c]oncurrent with Congressional 
consideration of the Medicare and Medicaid legislation in the mid-1960s, however, exempt 
hospitals began pushing the IRS for reconsideration of exemption standards. The common 
complaint (almost hilarious, in retrospect, for its inaccuracy) was that between private medical 
insurance and the ‘new’ Medicare and Medicaid programs, there simply would not be enough 
of a demand for charity care to satisfy the IRS, and hence exemption standards should 
become more flexible in order to maintain exempt status for hospitals.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (1969). 
 56. Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 1, at 13. 
 57. See id. 
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Under community benefit, the IRS specified four additional activities that 
would benefit the community, including: 
(1) “excess funds [used for the] expansion and replacement of existing 
facilities and equipment,”58 
(2) “amortization of indebtedness,”59 
(3) “improvement in patient care,”60 and 
(4) “medical training, education, and research.”61 
It was noted that the four requirements specified in IRS Rev. Rul. 69-545 did 
not replace the “charity care” standard that came before it,62 but it acted as 
a supplement or a companion standard that hospitals needed to meet in 
order to qualify for tax-exempt status.63 Thus, the practical impact of the 
“community benefit” ruling was to provide an additional outlet for hospitals 
to meet the tax-exempt requirements who had originally expressed concern 
over failing to meet the requirements as a result of Medicare and 
Medicaid.64 
Unlike the previous standard, community benefit provided options that 
would indirectly benefit patient care. Typical elements considered to fulfill 
community benefit include the promotion of health, “a community board, an 
open medical staff, treatment of Medicare and Medicaid patients, and the 
operation of an emergency room that provided emergency treatment to 
charity patients.”65 However, a 1983 ruling by the IRS eliminated the 
operation of an emergency room as an element.66 Under community 
benefit, net income for tax-exempt entities was allowed to be reinvested into 
plant, property, and equipment; debt expense; advancements for the care of 
patients; and also improvements in medical training, education and 
research.67 These elements qualified for fulfilling community benefit 
obligations.68 
 
 58. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (1969). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 1. 
 63. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (1969). 
 64. Colombo, supra note 2, at 30-31. 
 65. Id. at 31. 
 66. Id. at 31-32. 
 67. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (1969). 
 68. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
458 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 7:449 
E. Criticisms of the Community Benefit Standard 
The community benefit standard, however, is not without its critics.69 
John D. Colombo, a preeminent tax-exempt organization scholar, published 
a blistering critique of the standard in a 2005 Health Matrix article titled, 
“The Failure of the Community Benefit Standard.”70 Colombo traces the 
standard from its start in the late 1960s and argues that it was not only 
undermined by the IRS almost immediately, but also was “essentially 
abandoned” by the late 1980s71 and wiped out by rulings on whether 
integrated delivery systems (IDS)72 and health maintenance organizations 
(HMO)73 qualified for tax-exempt status.74 After twenty years, industry 
stakeholders highlighted the need for a way to measure how charitable 
hospitals provide a benefit to their communities and its impact on their 
community’s health.75 Today, contemporary criticisms circle around the idea 
that many “community benefit activities,”76 such as community health fairs 
and outreach, can mask a financial benefit for tax-exempt organizations:77 
“[m]oreover, many services that nonprofit hospitals pointed to as 
‘community benefit’ had commercial potential: outreach programs, for 
example, such as community education and health screening ‘may serve 
marketing and other promotional purposes for hospitals, just as sponsorship 
of sporting events or the arts does for many for-profit corporations.’”78 
Further, in reference to studies that highlight any behavioral or outcome 
differences between the for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, Colombo 
 
 69. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 30-31 (noting at the beginning of his article, “to 
paraphrase Marc Antony’s famous speech in Julius Caesar, I come to bury the community 
benefit test, not to praise it”). 
 70. See Colombo, supra note 2. 
 71. Id. at 40. “The community benefit test, therefore, failed to isolate any significant 
quantifiable behavioral differences between for-profit and nonprofit health care providers, and 
hence it probably was doomed as a doctrinal legal test of exemption literally from its 
inception.” Id. at 42. 
 72. Id. at 33-34 (citing Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 1210, 1219-20 (3d 
Cir. 1993)). 
 73. Id. at 36-37 (citing IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 
2003)). 
 74. Id. at 40, 42. 
 75. Id. at 42 (“In fact, the problem of identifying specific, quantifiable ‘community 
benefits’ became so severe that supporters of the nonprofit exempt hospital industry published 
a number of articles in the early 1990s warning of the need to quantify these other community 
benefits to preserve exemption.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 42 (citing Mark A. Schlesinger & Bradford Gary, A Broader Vision for Managed 
Care, Part 1: Measure the Benefit to Communities, 17 HEALTH AFF. 152, 155 (May-June 
1998)). 
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notes that the academic literature and governmental inquiries have found 
little to no difference between the two.79 
Although an analysis of the community benefit standard’s effectiveness 
in patient treatment or to induce behavioral differences between for-profits 
and not-for-profits is outside the academic scope of this Comment, perhaps 
the most sobering view of the standard’s role in contemporary healthcare 
can be highlighted by a 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report.80 In that report, the GAO studied five cities to determine what 
difference, if any, existed between the charity care and community benefit of 
for-profit, nonprofit, and government hospitals.81 The report stated, 
As for the other community benefit hospitals reported providing, we were not 
able to discern a clear distinction among the government, nonprofit, and 
for-profit hospital groups. Hospitals in the five states reported conducting a 
variety of activities, which the hospitals themselves considered community 
benefits. We were unable to assess the value of these benefits or make 
systematic comparisons between hospitals across states.82 
The report also noted that a significant portion of community benefit 
activities were concentrated in a few urban hospitals and were not uniformly 
spread across the tax-exempt charitable hospital sector.83 The GAO 
Comptroller continued to note that the “current tax policy lacks specific 
criteria” to guide the hospitals in their charity care efforts, and called for 
clearly defined goals.84 
Many commentators have argued that a repeal of the standard is likely 
the most plausible solution to induce the charitable healthcare entities to 
return to a semblance of their modern roots.85 However, not all 
commentators share the “scorched Earth” solution to resolving the problem, 
and some have even highlighted the positive aspects the standard has 
brought to the nonprofit sector, such as unprofitable services that the for-
profit sector is unwilling to offer.86 Thus, despite the community benefit 
 
 79. Columbo, supra note 2, at 44-45. 
 80. See Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Government Hospitals: Uncompensated Care and 
Other Community Benefits, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 
(2005) [hereinafter GAO Uncompensated Care Testimony] (Statement of David M. Walker, 
Comptroller General of the United States). 
 81. Id. at 6. 
 82. Id. at 19. 
 83. Id. at 8. 
 84. Id. at 19. 
 85. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 52-53. 
 86. Id. at 56 (citing Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, 
Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1407 (2003)) (noting that 
“Professor Horwitz asserts that non-profits are necessary because they bring a mix of health 
services that for-profits do not provide, and offer protection against ‘a class-based two-tiered 
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standard’s perceived widespread dysfunction, some academic 
commentators have noticed its positive impact within the industry.87 
However, the increasingly murky gap between hospitals’ actions to fulfill the 
standard, and the public knowledge of how these actions actually benefit 
the surrounding community, eventually gave rise to Congressional interest in 
how to overhaul the Code and promote more tangible outcomes.88 This 
largely culminated with § 9007 of the ACA and the addition of § 501(r) to 
the Code.89 
III.  CHARITABLE HOSPITALS, THE ACA, AND 
THE COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
A. The ACA, § 501(r) of the Code, and the “Community Benefit Redux” 
Standard 
The recent additions to the Code can only be understood in the context 
of community benefits meandering and maligned history through Rev. Rul. 
69-545 and its influence on the tax-exempt charitable hospital sector.90 The 
charity care standard was a black or white affair; hospitals either provided 
reduced-cost or free care to qualified individuals or they did not.91 Whether 
hospitals qualified for tax-exempt status was easily determined by the IRS. 
However, as a result of judicial interpretation of “community benefit,” it was 
subject to interpretation and potential abuse by hospital systems.92 A 2008 
 
medical system’ in which the poor are treated by government-owned hospitals while the well-
insured have access to private hospitals”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 1, at 2-3; Taking the Pulse of Charitable 
Care, supra note 8, at 2; S. COMM. ON FIN. - MINORITY, 110TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT HOSPITALS: 
DISCUSSION DRAFT 7 (2007), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/releases/2007/07182007.pdf. 
See also Memorandum from Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. S. Comm on Fin., 
to Reporters and Editors (July 18, 2007), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/news 
room/ranking/release/?id=4e7e7efc-806d-4a02-a4bf-d41f9a5dd55f. 
 89. See John Carreyrou & Barbara Martinez, Grassley Targets Nonprofit Hospitals on 
Charity Care, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A5. No discussion of § 9007 of the ACA is 
complete without mention of Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) for his integral role in the 
additional requirements for charitable hospitals. See Grassley Provisions Make Tax-Exempt 
Hospitals Accountable for Status under New Healthcare Legislation, BECKER’S HOSP. REV., (Mar. 
25, 2010), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/news-analysis/grassley-provisions-make-
tax-exempt-hospitals-accountable-for-status-under-new-healthcare-legislation.html. See also 
Memorandum from Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. S. Comm on Fin., to 
Reporters and Editors (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/ 
Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=25912. See also Thai, supra note 3, at 772. 
 90. See supra Part II.B-E. 
 91. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (1956). 
 92. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 42-43 (discussing problems with quantifying 
community benefit standards). 
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report by the GAO highlighted a Congressional Budget Office finding that 
“[n]onprofit hospitals may not be defining community benefit in a consistent 
manner that would enable policymakers to hold them accountable for 
providing benefits commensurate with their tax-exempt status.”93 This 2008 
report was in response from a request by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) 
and the Senate Finance Committee to prepare a report about U.S. tax-
exempt hospitals.94 
B. CHNA Requirements, IRS Notice 2011-52 & Proposed Regulations 
The CHNA is an additional requirement for tax-exempt hospitals and 
was added by § 9007 of the ACA.95 Section 9007 of the ACA amended the 
Code of 1986 by striking the existing subsection (s) and designating a new 
subsection (r), which requires four additional requirements for hospitals to 
qualify for tax-exempt status.96 In addition to the CHNA, the § 501(r) 
requirements include (1) the FAP and EMC policies, (2) a limitation on 
charges to patients who qualify for the FAP, and finally (3) restrictions on 
billing and collections, barring the hospital from engaging in extraordinary 
collections actions (ECAs) against FAP qualified individuals.97 
Here, this section will focus on the practical implications of the CHNA 
and how it will impact hospitals as originally proposed. Section 9007 of the 
ACA notes that the CHNA has three core requirements: 
 
 93. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-880, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS: VARIATION 
IN STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE LIMITS COMPARISON OF HOW HOSPITALS MEET COMMUNITY BENEFIT 
REQUIREMENTS 3 (2008). See also GAO Uncompensated Care Testimony, supra note 80, at 16 
(2005) (highlighting a general overview of the community benefit activities reported by 
hospitals including (a) community health education such as parenting education, smoking 
cessation, fitness and nutrition, health fairs, and diabetes management; (b) health screening 
services such as screening for high cholesterol, cancer, and diabetes; (c) clinic services, 
including clinics targeted to specific groups in the community, such as indigent patients; (d) 
medical education for physicians, nurses, and other health professionals; (e) financial 
contributions, including cash donations and grants, to community organizations; (f) 
coordination of community events and in-kind donations – such as food, clothing, and 
meeting room space – to community organizations; and (g) hospital facility and other 
infrastructure improvements). 
 94. Memorandum from U.S. S. Comm. on Fin. to Reporters and Editors (Oct. 14, 2008), 
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=009896fa-cf35-
4d04-93e9-d1cc0fe03994. 
 95. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.; Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38148. 
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(1) it “takes into account input from persons who represent the broad 
interests of the community served by the hospital facility, including those 
with special knowledge of or expertise in public health,”98 
(2) the hospital “has adopted an implementation strategy to meet the 
community health needs identified through such assessment,”99 and 
(3) that the CHNA “is made widely available to the public.”100 
A hospital failing to meet the CHNA requirements for any taxable year is 
subject to a $50,000 excise tax.101 The IRS discussed provisions of new § 
501(r) of the Code in the June 2012 Federal Register,102 but only briefly 
touched on the CHNA requirements because of in-depth treatment in its 
Notice 2011-52 (Notice), which requested public comments of how the 
agency would enforce and implement the CHNA requirements.103 The 
agency released proposed regulations for the CHNA in early 2013 that 
provided further clarification for tax-exempt organizations.104 
Second, the Notice stated that “only organizations operating State-
licensed hospital facilities will be considered ‘hospital organizations’ that 
must satisfy the CHNA requirements.”105 The Notice also highlighted § 
501(r)(2)(B), which noted “(i) the organization shall meet the requirements of 
§ 501(r) separately with respect to each hospital facility, and (ii) the 
organization shall not be treated as described in section 501(c)(3) with 
respect to any hospital facility for which the requirements of § 501(r) are not 
separately met.”106 The IRS highlighted that they “intend to require a 
hospital organization operating multiple hospital facilities to document 
separately the CHNA and the implementation strategy for each of its 
hospital facilities.”107 It is still unclear what impact failing to meet the CHNA 
requirements for one facility will have on the organization as a whole.108 
Commentators were divided on the level of specificity desired from the IRS, 
 
 98. I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 60, 62-63. 
 99. Id. at 66. 
 100. Id. at 62. 
 101. Id. at 65. 
 102. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38149. 
 103. I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 60. 
 104. Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed. Reg. 20523 
(Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 53). 
 105. I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 61. This Comment will not discuss the tax-
implications or potential impact of complex business associations. These include organizations 
that “operate[ ] a State-licensed hospital facility through a disregarded entity or a joint venture, 
limited liability company, or other entity treated as a partnership for federal income tax 
purposes.” Id. 
 106. Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. at 61-62. 
 108. Id. at 62. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] COMMUNITY BENEFIT 501(R)EDUX 463 
splitting between defined guidelines for facilities to follow and loose 
regulations for facilities to design a CHNA that reflects their community.109 
In the end, the IRS identified five requirements: 
(1) “[a] description of the community served by the hospital facility,”110 
(2) “[a] description of the process and methods used to conduct the 
assessment,”111 
(3) “[a] description of how the hospital organization took into account input 
from persons who represent the broad interests of the community served 
by the hospital facility,”112 
(4) “[a] prioritized description of all of the community health needs 
identified through the CHNA, [and] a description of the process and 
criteria used in prioritizing such health needs,” and113 
(5) “[a] description of the existing health care facilities and other resources 
within the community available to meet the community health needs 
identified through the CHNA.”114 
It further noted that the CHNA will be considered “conducted” when the 
report is published and made widely available to the public.115 Hospitals are 
allowed to define their own “community” that is targeted in their CHNA by 
taking into account “all of the relevant facts,” which include the target 
population of the hospital (i.e., cancer specialty or children’s hospital) or 
common geographic areas like cities, counties, or districts.116 Self-serving 
definitions are prohibited.117 
The IRS considered public feedback from Notice 2011-52 in the April 
2013 proposed regulations and implemented a significant suggestion from 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 62. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 62. 
 116. Id. at 63. 
 117. See id. (noting “a community may not be defined in a manner that circumvents the 
requirement to assess the health needs of (or consult with persons who represent the broad 
interests of) the community served by a hospital facility by excluding, for example, medically 
underserved populations, low-income persons, minority groups, or those with chronic disease 
needs”). See also id. at 64 (noting that one of the requirements to comply with the CHNA is to 
make it widely available to the public; the agency noted similar requirements for hospital’s 
Forms 990 under Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-2(b) where hospitals either need to make the 
CHNA easily accessible on its website, or provide a link from its website to a companion 
website). 
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the commenters.118 Noticeably absent from the IRS’s initial CHNA notice 
was an evaluation of the impact or “outcomes” from programs designed to 
address significant health needs identified through the CHNA process.119 
The proposed rule notes “the implementation strategy must describe the 
actions the hospital facility intends to take to address the health need, the 
anticipated impact of these actions, and a plan to evaluate such impact.”120 
It is arguable that the evaluation component included in the proposed 
regulations pushes health systems to identify programs that will have a 
quantifiable outcome compared to the guidance issued in the initial CHNA 
notice; in other words, the April 2013 proposed regulations will establish 
increased accountability for health systems to identify an internal metric for 
evaluation that will allow the IRS to identify whether or not the programs 
designed to address significant health needs are successful. 
At this point in the CHNA process, it is likely that a hospital organization 
will be able to partner with community public health stakeholders to identify 
vulnerable populations that reside in its self-defined community.121 From 
here, the individual hospitals must address the findings of their CHNA 
research with an “implementation strategy”122 that takes into account the 
needs identified in the early parts of a CHNA and how the facility plans to 
address those needs using the resources in its facility and its community.123 
 
 118. Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed. Reg. 20523, 
20524, 20534 (Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 53). 
 119. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 60. 
 120. Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
20542. 
 121. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 63 (noting that the health care facilities 
can obtain the requisite knowledge for adequate CHNAs from the following qualified 
individuals: “(1) [p]ersons with special knowledge of or expertise in public health; (2) Federal, 
tribal, regional, State, or local health or other departments or agencies, with current data or 
other information relevant to the health needs of the community served by the hospital facility; 
and (3) [l]eaders, representatives, or members of medically underserved, low-income, and 
minority populations, and populations with chronic disease needs, in the community served by 
the hospital facility”). 
 122. Id. at 64. 
 123. Id. (“For these purposes, Treasury and the IRS intend to provide that an 
implementation strategy will address a health need identified through a CHNA for a particular 
hospital facility if the written plan either – (1) describes how the hospital facility plans to meet 
the health needs; or (2) identifies the health need as one the hospital facility does not intend to 
meet and explains why the hospital facility does not intend to meet the health need. In 
describing how a hospital facility plans to meet a health need identified through a CHNA for 
purposes of paragraph (1), the implementation strategy must tailor the description to the 
particular hospital facility, taking into account its specific programs, resources, and priorities. 
For example, an implementation strategy could describe a hospital facility’s plan to meet a 
health need by identifying the programs and resources that the hospital facility plans to 
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The “strategy” is considered formally adopted on the date it is approved by 
the individual hospital facility’s governing board or delegated committee.124 
A hospital is liable for a $50,000 excise tax for each of its hospital facilities 
it operates if it fails to satisfy any of the CHNA requirements for any of the 
three taxable years in the “CHNA window.”125 If an organization continually 
fails to meet the specified requirements after being subject to the $50,000 
excise tax, the organization will have to pay the excise tax penalty in each 
year after it initially does not meet the CHNA requirements.126 For example, 
if hospital A’s “CHNA window” is in taxable years 2016-2018, and it has 
not met the CHNA requirements by the last taxable day in 2018, it will be 
subject to a $50,000 excise tax for that year.127 If the hospital fails to meet 
the requirements in 2019 and 2020, it will also be subject to an excise tax 
of $50,000 in 2019 and 2020.128 Moreover, if the hospital is responsible 
for “n” facilities which do not meet the CHNA specifications, its excise tax 
would be calculated as $50,000 times n.129 
The ACA amended § 6033 of the Code and “requires a hospital 
organization to report . . . a description of how the organization is 
addressing the needs identified in each CHNA and a description of any such 
needs that are not being addressed together with the reasons why such 
needs are not being addressed.”130 The IRS has also included additional 
questions to Form 990 Schedule H.131 
 
commit to meeting the health need and the anticipated impact of those programs and 
resources on the health need.”). 
 124. Id. at 65. 
 125. Id. 
 126. I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 65. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. See also ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 131. I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 65. Schedule H was adopted by the IRS in 
2008 to standardize reporting requirements for tax-exempt hospitals. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
BACKGROUND PAPER, FORMS 990, MOVING FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW 31 (2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/moving_from_old_to_new.pdf. The CHNA “implementation 
strategy” must be attached to the Form 990 in each of the three years of the “CHNA window.” 
I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 65-66 (“If a hospital organization only conducts one 
CHNA and adopts one implementation strategy for a hospital facility in a given three-year 
period, Treasury and the IRS intend to allow it to attach the same implementation strategy for 
that hospital facility to the Form 990 for each of those three years.”). 
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IV.  ANALYZING §501(R) AND THE CHNA UNDER PROFESSOR JESSICA BERG’S 
FRAMEWORK AS ILLUSTRATED IN PUTTING THE COMMUNITY BACK INTO THE 
“COMMUNITY BENEFIT STANDARD,” A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Professor Jessica Berg, in Putting the Community Back into the 
“Community Benefit Standard,” argues that the historic community benefit 
standard implemented in Rev. Rul. 69-545 could be improved by 
implementing changes focused on public health initiatives.132 Her thesis is 
largely driven by public health concerns with a community focus,133 
providing that community benefit interventions should benefit a community 
population and not the individual.134 In her article, she notes that it has 
traditionally been the role of the federal government to take care of a 
population, and not necessarily the individual.135 As a result of this 
traditional role, any federal mandates for community benefit should focus 
on communal outcomes in the service areas of the health systems and not 
focus on traditional charity care requirements, which are solely focused on 
healthcare provided at the individual level.136 Similar to the CHNA adopted 
in ACA § 9007 and implemented in § 501(r), Professor Berg’s pre-ACA 
suggestions may be seen as a corollary to the changes adopted in § 
501(r)(3).137 The suggestions provide a framework to analyze whether the 
ACA achieved her goals of meaningful reform within the community benefit 
arena, with a particular focus on policy and intermediate sanctions at the 
federal level,138 a “community benefit board,”139 and a tool to assess public 
health outcomes related to community benefit activities.140 In her 
suggestions for reform, Berg also recommends adopting a novel approach 
to tracking community benefit initiatives through accounting practices 
adopted in other business disciplines.141 This ultimate provision will not be 
discussed. 
 
 132. Berg, supra note 4, at 395-402. 
 133. Id. at 377-79. 
 134. Id. at 393-94. 
 135. Id. at 396. 
 136. Id. at 401-02. See also Colombo, supra note 2, at 32-35 (discussing how the tax 
courts and the federal courts started to undermine Revenue Ruling 69-545 by removing the 
ruling’s focus on “community” efforts to a focus on “charity care” in the late 1980s and early 
1990s). 
 137. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See also Berg, supra note 4, at 403. 
 138. Berg, supra note 4, at 405. 
 139. Id. at 407. 
 140. Id. at 412. 
 141. Id. at 419. 
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A. Federal Level Changes - Policy Drivers 
For federal policy changes, Berg suggests that the most significant 
requirement for any reform is a determination of the hospital community’s 
“need” of those services offered by the hospital to fulfill its community 
benefit requirements.142 In her article, writing pre-ACA and the new reform 
to community benefit under §501(r), Professor Berg argued that “[r]ather 
than creating a comprehensive and exclusive list of exactly what the 
community benefit requirement entails, the IRS should provide guidance on 
the range of activities that would fall into this category.”143 She further 
argued that the agency could partially accomplish this goal through 
rearranging Form 990 and moving the “community health services” section 
above charity care, decreasing the historical, judicial, and agency emphasis 
on the latter.144 Her ultimate goal in her article is to facilitate a discernible 
message from the IRS to tax-exempt hospitals that a transition from policies 
focusing on the individual (i.e., charity care) to the community is the ultimate 
goal of any meaningful reform at the federal level for community benefit. To 
a large extent, the CHNA achieves this goal. 
Analyzing § 501(r)’s new requirements for charitable hospitals under 
Berg’s framework, “community benefit redux” fulfills the need for additional 
“guidance” from the IRS to communicate the message that community 
benefit should be more focused on community outcomes as opposed to 
individual initiatives. Although the FAP, limitation on charges, and 
prohibition against ECAs are aimed at controlling community benefit actions 
by hospitals that are aimed at curbing undesirable practices at the individual 
patient level,145 going against Berg’s suggestions for meaningful change, § 
501(r)(3)’s CHNA is a drastic shift toward a focus on the health system’s 
community impact. Her suggestion was to rearrange Form 990’s hierarchy 
of community benefit activities to place “community health improvement 
services” evaluation above the hospital’s charity care activities,146 
communicating the message that a community focus is much more 
important than an individual focus. The ACA’s changes fulfill this suggestion 
for meaningful reform and then some. 
Both IRS Notice 2011-52 and the April 2013 proposed regulations 
provide prescriptive guidance for all health systems in conducting and 
documenting its CHNA process,147 but it is the latter’s incorporation of 
 
 142. Id. at 404. 
 143. Berg, supra note 4, at 403. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 405. 
 146. Id. at 403. 
 147. Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
20524. 
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public feedback from the former that encompasses its fulfillment of Berg’s 
pre-ACA reform suggestions. The IRS’s CHNA guidance encapsulates a true 
focus on community benefit by requiring feedback from community 
members, the local public health department, in addition to underserved 
and minority populations.148 Incorporation of this feedback into the CHNA 
process fulfills her suggestion that “the services are needed and would 
actually benefit the community in which the hospital is located.”149 
Participation by community stakeholders help ensure that the services are 
those needed by the immediate community, and the April 2013 proposed 
regulation’s new requirements that the impact of those programs be 
identified and evaluated will likely help determine whether these programs 
are “actually benefiting the community.”150 
Therefore, if Revenue Ruling 69-545’s original goal was to provide an 
additional outlet for hospitals concerned about the reduction in charity care 
as a result of Medicare and Medicaid with a focus on community standards, 
and, as Colombo argues, that this community focus was almost immediately 
undermined by a return to charity care as a substantial element, Berg’s pre-
ACA suggestion for meaningful reform to persuade the IRS to require an 
actual focus on community efforts to improve health151 makes the ACA’s 
community benefit redux an overwhelming success. Community involvement 
is required by both the proposed regulations and 2011-52,152 although the 
actual impact on the community was not included until the April 2013 
proposed regulations.153 This addition helps round out Berg’s suggestions 
for policy changes at the federal level for meaningful community benefit 
reform. 
B. Federal Level Changes - Intermediate Sanctions 
Next, Professor Berg posited that any framework for change under pre-
ACA community benefit requirements needed to implement some sort of 
“intermediate sanction” as a stick to change behavior, instead of revocation 
of tax-exempt status’ nuclear solution.154 She noted: 
[i]t may be useful to consider imposing intermediate sanctions for violations 
of the other IRS requirements, including the community benefit standard; but 
 
 148. Id. at 20541. 
 149. Berg, supra note 4, at 404. 
 150. Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
20534. 
 151. Colombo, supra note 2, at 31-32. See Berg, supra note 4, at 403-05. 
 152. Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
20524. 
 153. Id. at 20534. 
 154. Berg, supra note 4, at 405. 
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specific penalties, such as the excise taxes for excess benefit transactions, 
could only be applicable if there were a set level of community benefit 
required against which a hospital’s efforts could be measured.155 
Furthermore, she proposed that intermediate sanctions should not be 
immediately imposed, and should trigger IRS oversight in order to “ensure 
hospital compliance,”156 a practice largely followed as acknowledged by IRS 
Commissioner Everson in the mid-2000s in front of the House Ways and 
Means Committee.157 
The “intermediate sanctions” argument is a familiar weapon in the 
arsenal of community benefit opponents,158 and § 501(r) largely provides 
them with an answer to Professor Berg’s proposal for pre-ACA reform.159 
The ACA notes in § 4959, “[i]f a hospital organization which section 501(r) 
applies fails to meet the requirement of section 501(r)(3) for any taxable 
year, there is imposed on the organization a tax equal to $50,000.”160 
Community benefit proponents have the $50,000 intermediate sanction in 
their arsenal, yet, the ACA limits it to noncompliance with the CHNA and 
leaves §§ 501(r)(4)-(6) untouched by any intermediate sanctions.161 
Although the CHNA is arguably the most time-consuming and important 
component of the new requirements, hospital facilities will not be penalized 
with a $50,000 excise tax if they fail to adopt FAP/EMC policies, fail to 
 
 155. Id. at 406. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 1, at 14-15 (statement of Hon. Mark Everson, 
Comm’r, IRS). The Commissioner also notes that out of the 375 audits of health care 
organizations, 79 of them occurred as part of the agency’s “Team Examination Program” 
which is a team of tax professionals dedicated to auditing “large, complex organizations” that 
are “exceptionally resource intensive.” Id. (emphasis added). “In more than one quarter of our 
TEP health care cases we found tax exemption issues. In these cases, we can revoke the tax 
status of the organization. We have done so in only a few instances because traditionally we 
attempt to get a tax-exempt organization back on the right track.” Id. (emphasis added). “(We 
have generally reserved revocation for cases in which we believe the organization is incapable 
of furthering exempt purposes in the future.) We attempt to resolve exemption issues with the 
taxpayer short of revocation, often through the use of a closing agreement. Almost half of the 
health care TEP cases ended in this fashion.” Id. As of 2012, as a partial response to § 9007 
of the ACA, the IRS has instituted reviews of 1,700 healthcare organizations to ensure 
compliance with the additional requirements for charitable hospitals detailed in IRC § 
1.501(r). See DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2012-13-070, AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: WHILE MUCH HAS BEEN 
ACCOMPLISHED, THE EXTENT OF ADDITIONAL CONTROLS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT TAX-EXEMPT 
HOSPITALS PROVISIONS IS UNCERTAIN (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/audit 
reports/2012reports/201213070fr.pdf. 
 158. See Berg, supra note 4, at 405-07. 
 159. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 160. Id. (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. 
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impose limitations on charges, and fail to follow acceptable billings and 
collections practices.162 Thus, much like Berg’s suggestion that any reform 
must avoid definitive list of actions required for community benefit 
compliance,163 § 501(r) is also deficient for “intermediate sanctions” 
because it is limited to enforcement for noncompliance only with the 
CHNA.164 
Not only is §501(r) deficient under Professor Berg’s framework in 
reference to “intermediate sanctions” and the $50,000 excise tax limited to 
the CHNA, but the $50,000 has a disproportionate impact in widely 
disparate hospital systems. For example, Mercy’s corporate headquarters 
are located in St. Louis, Missouri and the health system has healthcare 
facilities in Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma.165 Overall, the 
system has 38 facilities in which it will likely need to conduct a CHNA.166 
Mercy is the overarching parent corporation for these 38 facilities, and 
reported $358.7 million in net income on $4.1 billion of revenue for 
2012.167 All of Mercy’s 38 hospitals are potentially subject to the $50,000 
excise tax, for a hypothetical one-year penalty of $1.6 million, or 0.45% of 
net income for not complying with the CHNA requirements.168 In contrast, 
Spencer Hospital — a community hospital in Spencer, Iowa reported $6.9 
million in net income on just over $67.7 million in operating revenue.169 
Spencer Hospital’s potential adverse impact of a $50,000 excise tax is 
0.73% of net income.170 Although these figures of 0.45% and 0.73% for 
Mercy and Spencer Hospital, respectively, are relatively small, they also 
underscore the fact the excise tax may have a disproportionate impact on 
smaller community hospitals.171 
 
 162. See id. (noting that a facility is not subject to an excise tax for noncompliance with §§ 
501(r)(4)-(6)). 
 163. Berg, supra note 4, at 403. 
 164. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 165. About Mercy, MERCY, http://www.mercy.net/about (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See MERCY, MOMENTUM: ANNUAL REPORT 2012 (2012), available at http://www.mer 
cy.net/sites/default/files/wb/2012mercyannual/. 
 168. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38151 
(discussing the $50,000 excise tax). 
 169. Spencer Hospital Audit Shows Solid Financial Performance, SPENCER DAILY REPORTER 
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.spencerdailyreporter.com/story/1913962.html. 
 170. Id. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38151 
(discussing the $50,000 excise tax). 
 171. See John Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 J. WASH. U. 
L.Q. 343, 344-45 (2004) (citing Edward C. Norton & Douglas O. Staiger, How Hospital 
Ownership Affects Access to Care for the Uninsured, 25 RAND J. ECON. 171, 172 (1994)) 
(discussing the potential importance of rural community hospitals to the surrounding area). 
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Moreover, the two hospital examples used in the hypothetical are 
financially solvent healthcare organizations172 and most likely able to 
conduct a CHNA pursuant to the IRS Notice 2011-52 and the proposed 
regulations.173 Yet, community hospitals often struggle financially and are 
thus likely unable to afford to conduct a CHNA, and as a result may be out 
of compliance.174 To truly illustrate the potential disproportionate impact on 
community hospitals, consider two hospitals within a 40 mile radius of 
Spencer Hospital in Northwest Iowa — Osceola Community Hospital and 
Lakes Regional Hospital, located in Sibley and Spirit Lake, Iowa, 
respectively.175 For 2011, Osceola had exactly $51,256 net income on 
$13,789,501 gross revenues.176 But Osceola’s $51,000 in net income 
illustrates the point that the $50,000 “intermediate sanction” introduced by 
Berg and implemented in §501(r) is miniscule for some, and overly 
burdensome for others.177 Furthermore, if one considers Lakes Regional 
Hospital’s negative $535,596 net income on $44,282,136 in gross 
revenue, §501(r)’s CHNA penalty is truly undermined as a legitimate option 
to encourage enforcement across the spectrum of hospitals from Mercy to 
rural community hospitals. This disproportionate impact is only exacerbated 
by the fact that these community hospitals are some of the few healthcare 
services in the area for emergencies, and thus integral components of their 
community,178 perhaps even more so than the hospitals that can afford a 
$50,000 hit.179 Again, Professor Berg’s framework for pre-ACA changes to 
the community benefit standard do not introduce a viable tool to promote 
compliance180 because a small stick in one instance is proportionally large 
 
 172. See SPENCER DAILY REPORTER, supra note 169. See MERCY, supra note 167. 
 173. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 60. 
 174. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38151 
(discussing the $50,000 excise tax). 
 175. Identification and Characteristics: Lakes Regional Hospital, AMERICAN HOSPITAL 
DIRECTORY, http://www.ahd.com/free_profile/160124/Lakes_Regional_Hospital/Spirit_Lake/ 
Iowa/ (last updated Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Lakes Regional Hospital]; Identification and 
Characteristics: Osceola Community Hospital, AMERICAN HOSPITAL DIRECTORY, http://www.ahd. 
com/free_profile.php?hcfa_id=ceee5868fcd38a80916f5f159d1dfe03&ek=96aadca2fe9ad
4278271b52377db3f18 (last updated Sept. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Osceola Community 
Hospital]. 
 176. Osceola Community Hospital, supra note 175. 
 177. Berg, supra note 4, at 402. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 
Fed. Reg. at 38151 (discussing the $50,000 excise tax). See also Osceola Community 
Hospital, supra note 175 (noting Osceola Community Hospital’s 2011 net income of a little 
over $50,000). 
 178. Colombo, supra note 171, at 344. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Berg, supra note 4, at 406. 
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on the other end of the tax-exempt spectrum,181 and §501(r) fails under her 
framework for meaningful reform. 
Thus, although we do have the intermediate sanctions under § 501(r) as 
envisioned by Professor Berg,182 they are largely ineffective at evenly 
distributing penalties across the sector and are severely limited by their 
inability to account for differences in the $50,000 penalty’s proportional 
impact on the diverse revenues of the charitable hospitals. This penalty 
could ultimately undermine the community outreach/health goals posited by 
Professor Berg and embodied in the CHNA on small, community hospitals. 
The IRS cannot overcome these limitations, as the $50,000 penalty is written 
into the law.183 Furthermore, the “intermediate sanctions” argument for 
meaningful reform is undermined by the fact that at least some 
commentators have noted “for many hospitals, it will be far more cost-
effective to shell out $50,000 than to comply with Section 501(r),”184 but 
this argument is largely undermined by the fact tax-exempt charitable 
hospitals are often unwilling to compromise the status of their federal tax-
exemption.185 
C. Creating a Community Benefit Board 
Professor Berg’s third component of meaningful reform under her pre-
ACA suggestions focuses on the need of a Community Benefit Board (CBB) 
to oversee compliance with her suggested standards.186 The CBB’s goal in 
her suggested framework is to “ensure that the services offered are, in fact, 
beneficial to the specific community in which the hospital operates.”187 
Among other suggestions, the board would be responsible to align the 
hospital’s community benefit requirements under § 501(c)(3), very similar to 
the ACA’s CHNA.188 Interestingly, writing pre-ACA, Professor Berg highlights 
that “some federal congressional health reform proposals have included 
 
 181. See infra Part V.B. (discussing the potential adverse impact on community hospitals of 
a $50,000 excise tax). 
 182. Berg, supra note 4, at 406. 
 183. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 184. Katie Stewart & Darren Azman, Section 501(r) and Nonprofit Hospital Joint Ventures, 
TAX’N OF EXEMPTS, September/October 2010, at 9, 18. 
 185. See Douglas Mancino, Section 501(r) Requirements for Section 501(c)(3) Hospitals, 
TAX’N OF EXEMPTS, January/February 2013, at 3, 3-4 (the author submitted a copy of the 
article with his comments submitted in response to the IRS proposed regulations for § 501(r) 
implementation). 
 186. Berg, supra note 4, at 407, 409. 
 187. Id. at 407. 
 188. Id. at 407-12; ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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community-needs-assessment requirements for tax-exempt hospitals.”189 
Overall, the suggestions of a CBB in potential pre-ACA meaningful reform 
framework embody the community health focus of the CHNA, and the § 
501(r)(3)’s relatively straightforward requirements190 are an improvement 
over Berg’s overly complicated suggestions.191 Here, there are few criticisms 
of the CHNA, in that it identifies a relationship with the tax-exempt hospital’s 
community in order to address the community health needs to fulfill the 
community benefit standard.192 The CHNA, as proposed, fulfills Berg’s 
suggestions and is the first victory for § 501(r) under Professor Berg’s 
meaningful reform framework to address public health needs.193 
D. Evaluating and Quantifying the Benefit 
In the final section of Professor Berg’s framework for meaningful reform 
to address the complications of the pre-ACA community benefit standard, 
she asks how population benefits should be measured under her CBB, 
which parallels § 501(r)’s CHNA.194 She proposes measuring a hospital’s 
“monetary outlay” as it relates to charity care under the standard, but 
acknowledges this approach is limited.195 To overcome this limitation, she 
suggests “institutions should be encouraged to measure the actual effects or 
outcome of their efforts,”196 which is superior to fiscal measurement because 
“it should discourage creative accounting similar to what currently occurs 
regarding individual charity care, and also because the goal of the 
community benefit standard is to benefit the community, not merely to 
promote hospital spending on interventions of uncertain value.”197 
To the extent which Professor Berg’s argument emphasizes the reporting 
of outcomes to measure community benefit compliance, § 501(r)’s CHNA 
fulfills these variables as defined under her suggested framework. 
Specifically, the changes to Form 990, Schedule H will permit a quantifiable 
reporting mechanism to aid the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services report to both Houses of Congress after five years on 
 
 189. Berg, supra note 4, at 408-09 (citing Diane Freda, Exempt Hospital Proposals for 
Health Reform Launch New Debate on Change in Standards, 18 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 651, 
652 (2009)) (emphasis added). 
 190. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 60. 
 191. Berg, supra note 4, at 409. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. at 407-12, 431. 
 194. Id. at 412-13. 
 195. Id. at 412. 
 196. Berg, supra note 4, at 412-13. See also Rubin et al., supra note 24, at 614. 
 197. Berg, supra note 4, at 413 (citing R. Scott MacStravic, Demonstrating Value: 
Healthcare Organizations Can Document Positive Outcomes from Their Community-Benefit 
Services, 80 HEALTH PROGRESS 54, 57 (Jan.-Feb. 1999)). 
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community benefit trends.198 In short, the CHNA’s relationship to Schedule 
H will finally provide the coveted quantifiable information so desired by 
proponents and opponents of the community benefit standard. Thus, § 
501(r) certainly fulfills the requirement of comparing apples to apples. 
Yet, despite the coveted status bestowed upon quantifiable activities in 
the community benefit realm199 and in Professor Berg’s framework, in 
practice, Schedule H’s quantifiable data for CHNAs may ultimately be ill-
suited for analysis.200 Granted, anything is better than the current 
comparison data, which is zilch, zippo, and nada, but Professor Berg almost 
immediately undermines her own argument shortly after introducing the idea 
of quantifiable activities for meaningful reform.201 She notes that “[i]t may be 
even more difficult to quantify population health benefits than it currently is 
to quantify individual health benefits,”202 and further notes that “population 
health benefits may take longer to become evident and thus may be hard to 
measure for yearly tax reporting.”203 Professor Berg acknowledges the 
difficulty inherently associated with measuring public health benefits, noting 
that successful public health initiatives, which the CHNA is designed to 
be,204 are measured by their “lack of illness and, thus, a lack of apparent 
benefit.”205 And even if certain public health outcomes are traceable, some 
commentators suggest it will prove difficult attributing responsibility in urban 
areas.206 
Thus, notwithstanding § 501(r)’s CHNA providing quantifiable, ergo 
comparable data, Professor Berg illustrates the inherent limitations in 
applying measurements to public health initiatives,207 which the community 
health needs assessment is under the ACA.208 Tax-exempt hospitals 
 
 198. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 199. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 41-42. 
 200. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 65 (stating the IRS has added new 
questions to Schedule H, Hospitals, of the Form 990 to reflect the new reporting requirements 
for hospital organizations under section 6033(b)(15)(A)). 
 201. Berg, supra note 4, at 420. 
 202. Id. (emphasis added). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 60 (stating that hospital organizations will 
be allowed to base a CHNA on information collected by a public health agency). 
 205. Berg, supra note 4, at 414 (citing ANN ASCHENGRAU & GEORGE R. SEAGE III, ESSENTIALS 
OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC HEALTH 3 (2003)). 
 206. Rubin et al., supra note 21, at 614. 
 207. Berg, supra note 4, at 420. 
 208. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See I.R.S. Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B. 60 (focusing on 
the relationship of the hospital to its surrounding community in order to effectively perform the 
CHNA). 
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conducting CHNAs may collect baseline data in order to track health 
outcomes as a result of their § 501(r) compliance programs, but even in this 
best-case-baseline-data scenario, the IRS and HHS will not be comparing 
apples to apples through Schedule H comparisons, but will be comparing 
apples, kiwis, oranges, and bananas. All are fruits, yet they are all different. 
For example, a diabetes education and outreach program in rural Nebraska 
is drastically different from a smoking cessation program in urban St. Louis. 
Both are designed to improve health outcomes, but which program did 
more for its community, and how do you determine what constitutes “more 
worth” or “better outcomes?”209 
Furthermore, under Form 990, CHNA reporting has no reportable 
outcome measures in Part V, Section B for Schedule H for hospitals.210 
Arguably, the closest “outcomes” reporting is line six where the hospital 
facility must identify how it addressed the needs identified under the 
CHNA.211 The following nine lines have action-oriented verbiage like 
“adoption,” “execution,” “participation,” “inclusion,” and “prioritization,”212 
but little for the IRS to report outcomes measures as proposed in Professor 
Berg’s framework,213 and arguably virtually no meaningful data for the 
IRS/HHS report to Congress214 that is any different from the existing 
community benefit efforts from tax-exempt hospitals.215 The only comparable 
reportable data under Schedule H for actions to address the needs identified 
in the CHNA is an “[a]doption of a budget for provision of services that 
 
 209. See Rubin et al., supra note 21, at 614 (noting that “[d]espite the inherent difficulties, 
attributing outcomes to specific community-benefit interventions is possible in well-defined 
circumstances” (emphasis added)). The authors continue to recount “well-defined” instances 
where outcomes measures are easily quantifiable, including a targeted initiative to educate 
mothers on the care of newborns. Id. The authors next recount instances of “population 
health” in certain hospitals, including a farmers market, and eventually draw a parallel to the 
ACA’s CHNA, and a potential opportunity for implement outcomes measures. Id. at 615. 
However, the lofty and unsupported assertions are largely undermined by Professor Berg’s 
acknowledgement of the severe limitations associated with measuring outcomes in public health 
initiatives. Berg, supra note 4, at 420. 
 210. I.R.S. Form 990, Schedule H-Hospitals, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/ 
f990sh.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (hereinafter “Form 990 Schedule H”). See also Rubin et 
al., supra note 21, at 614 (arguing that “Form 990 Schedule H, as it exists currently, focuses 
on inputs to assess the adequacy of a hospital’s community-benefit activities. Inputs, both 
monetary and non-monetary, play a crucial role in improving community health. In addition, 
from the perspective of the IRS, inputs are easy to measure and, more importantly, do not 
require risk adjustment and are thus less susceptible to gaming.”) (citing Peter A. Gross, M.D., 
Editorial Process Versus Outcome Measures, 50 MEDICAL CARE 200, 200-02 (2012)). 
 211. Form 990 Schedule H, supra note 210. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Berg, supra note 4, at 405-18. See also Rubin et al., supra note 21, at 612. 
 214. ACA § 9007. 
 215. See Form 990 Schedule H, supra note 210 (focusing on Parts I-III). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
476 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 7:449 
address the needs identified in the CHNA,”216 which may be ultimately 
undermined by the acknowledgement that some hospitals may find it less of 
a hassle to incur the $50,000 excise tax.217 
Furthermore, Professor Berg points out another severe limitation in that 
public health initiatives, which focus on preventative measures, likely will not 
manifest their worth for years and that it will be difficult to attribute results in 
year five to the program started in year one.218 Professor Berg rightly 
acknowledged these limitations in her framework, and they are ultimately 
another severe limitation of § 501(r)’s strongest component – the community 
health needs assessment, and as the next section illustrates, § 501(r)’s 
superficial reform is demonstrated in other areas of the new regulations. 
V.  LIMITATIONS OF THE ADDITIONAL SUBSECTIONS OF §501(R) 
Although the CHNA is the most substantial change for new federal tax-
exempt requirements, the IRS’s proposed regulations for the FAP and EMC 
policies, limitations on charges, and limitations on billing and collections 
practices also severely impact hospital operations.219 Professor Berg’s 
suggested reform framework pre-ACA highlighted meaningful elements in 
order to focus on population health within the community impacted by the 
tax-exempt charitable hospitals. As the previous section illustrates, her 
framework solely considering the most pivotal § 501(r) component – the 
CHNA – underscores the point that the additions to § 501(c)(3) charitable 
hospitals are likely similar to existing requirements for tax-exempt hospitals 
and existing actions usually performed by hospitals.220 Even if additional 
requirements for charitable hospitals prove workable under Professor Berg’s 
suggested framework,221 considering the history of the community benefit 
standard,222 existing obligations under federal law, and prevalent 
characteristics of the healthcare industry, §§ 501(r)(4)-(6) are independently 
deficient. Below, each of the additional sections will be discussed. 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Stewart & Azman, supra note 184, at 18. 
 218. Berg, supra note 4, at 418-19. Professor Berg suggests borrowing concepts from 
“accrual accounting” where organizations calculate the costs of borrowing debt capital over 
the life of the loan, and not during the first year. Id. 
 219. See infra Parts V.A-C. 
 220. See supra Parts IV.A-D. 
 221. See supra Parts IV.A-D. 
 222. See supra Parts II.C-E. 
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A. Financial Assistance Policy and Emergency Medical Care Policy, 
 § 501(r)(4) 
Charitable tax-exempt hospitals are required to implement a FAP in 
accordance with §501(r)(4) of the new regulations.223 Minimally, each 
hospital facility within an organization, or alternatively, the only hospital 
within a single hospital organization, must adopt a “written FAP that applies 
to . . . all emergency and other medically necessary care provided by the 
hospital facility.”224 The Code section also requires healthcare systems to 
establish a written policy pertaining to emergency medical care to all 
patients, whether or not they are eligible under the facility’s self-defined 
FAP.225 
Again, the § 501(r) requirements for the FAP and EMC policy are similar 
to existing requirements for charitable hospitals.226 As the proposed 
regulations illustrate, “an [EMC] policy will generally satisfy this standard if it 
requires [the hospital] to provide the care for any emergency medical 
condition that [the hospital] is required to provide” for Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) “standards and certifications and including the 
regulations under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
 
 223. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 865 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 38151-53. 
 224. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38151. The 
regulations highlight the components of an FAP that a hospital must have, including: “(1) 
Eligibility criteria for financial assistance, and whether such assistance includes free or 
discounted care; (2) the basis for calculating amounts charged to patients; (3) the method for 
applying for financial assistance; (4) in the case of an organization that does not have a 
separate billing and collections policy, the actions the organization may take in the event of 
nonpayment; and (5) measures to widely publicize the FAP within the community served by the 
hospital facility.” Id. Interestingly, in the discussion of the FAP in the proposed regulations, the 
Internal Revenue Service requested comments on the potential interrelationships between 
different sections of § 501(r), requesting comments on how the “community” defined by the 
CHNA may inform facilities’ FAP. Id. 
 225. Id. at 38153. The proposed regulations clarified that the new EMC must establish that 
the hospital will “provide, without discrimination, care for emergency medical conditions (within 
the meaning of EMTALA) to individuals, regardless of whether they are FAP-eligible.” Id. For 
this section, the IRS made clear that the only new requirement for hospitals in the EMC is to 
explicitly prohibit the act of immediately collecting on payments from the patient while they are 
still present in the emergency department. Id. 
 226. See Colombo, supra note 2, at 33-36 (discussing how community benefit reverted 
back to something similar to the “charity standard,” which Colombo classifies as “community 
benefit plus something else,” which he argues is a significant amount of charity care). See also 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012) (discussing 
the “examination and treatment for emergency medical conditions and women in labor” under 
existing federal law). 
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(EMTALA).”227 Thus, the EMC forces charitable hospitals to codify CMS and 
EMTALA requirements in their rules and regulations,228 when it is highly 
likely that hospitals are already complying with these federal regulations due 
to the important role of federal reimbursement to operations.229 Medicare 
payments may account for approximately 31% of hospital revenues,230 
underscoring the importance of compliance with CMS and EMTALA 
requirements, which § 501(r)(4)’s EMC requires hospitals to codify.231 
Even if § 501(r)(4)’s superficial change to the community benefit 
standard is not highlighted by the redundancy of the EMC, the facility’s FAP 
drives the point home. Professor Colombo aptly illustrated that almost 
immediately after introduction of the community benefit standard post Rev. 
Rul. 69-545, the IRS undermined the standard’s strength by essentially 
reverting back to the old charity care standard,232 noting that it was 
essentially a “community benefit plus” something else, the “plus” being 
charity care.233 As Colombo argued, the importance of the “plus” for tax-
exempt charitable hospitals was supported by the Tenth Circuit in IHC 
Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner.234 In his analysis, Colombo borrows 
language from the Tenth Circuit in the IHC Health Plans case, and notes 
that the court acknowledged activities such as research and medical training 
as complying with the community benefit standard,235 but first listed “free or 
below cost services” as a factor in the “plus” analysis.236 Therefore, it is 
arguable existing judicial precedent already forced hospitals to offer “free or 
below cost services,” as the Tenth Circuit identified it as an important 
factor.237 Similar to the EMC policy’s impact on existing behavior for tax-
 
 227. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38153 (emphasis 
added). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos behind a Veil of 
Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 59 (2006). See also Mark Taylor, New Medicare Cuts Will Force 
Hospitals to Plug Major Revenue Leak: Traditional Economizing Strategies Unlikely to be 
Efficient, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Sept. 2010, at 12 (estimating that anywhere from 35 to 
55% of hospital revenues are attributable to Medicare). 
 230. Reinhardt, supra note 229, at 59; Taylor, supra note 229, at 12. 
 231. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38153. 
 232. Colombo, supra note 2, at 35. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 37 (citing IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003)). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. at 37 (noting how despite the community benefit’s broad standard introduced 
in Rev. Rul. 69-545, subsequent cases relied on charity care as a “significant factor” in 
determining an entity’s compliance with community benefit) (citing IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003))). 
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exempt hospitals,238 § 501(r)(4)’s FAP simply forces the tax-exempt entities to 
codify an activity they were likely already performing prior to the ACA.239 
B. Limitation on Charges, § 501(r)(5) 
Section 501(r)(5) of the additional requirements for charitable hospitals 
will perhaps provide the most pivotal decision for tax-exempt healthcare 
entities240 as it determines how much FAP-eligible individuals will pay for 
emergency and medically necessary services.241 Facilities must choose either 
a “look-back” or “prospective” method for determining the amounts 
generally billed (AGB).242 Although the amendments to the Code and the 
proposed regulations limit charges to FAP-eligible patients, hospitals are, in 
practice, limited to charges to patients unable to pay because, by definition, 
they are unable to fulfill the financial obligation.243 So, the hospital 
previously may have billed poor patients its gross charges, fully 
understanding that it would eventually sell the inflated price to a debt 
collection agency, and receive a relatively high amount compared to what 
 
 238. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38153. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38153-54 
(discussing the differences between the “look-back” and “prospective” method for determining 
which technique to use to calculate the “amounts generally billed”). 
 241. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38153. Comments 
for industry stakeholders suggested that “widely publicizing” the FAP include utilizing “one or a 
combination” of these measures: “(1) posting information on the hospital facility’s Website; (2) 
distributing information at the hospital facility’s patient access points; (3) notifying patients upon 
admission; (4) posting information conspicuously in public areas of the hospital facility 
(including admissions areas, emergency rooms, waiting rooms, billing offices, outpatient 
reception areas, etc.); (5) including information with or on billing statements; (6) mentioning 
the FAP when discussing an individual’s bill over the telephone; (7) making the FAP available 
for public inspection and/or copying without charge at the hospital facility’s principal, regional, 
and district offices during regular business hours; (8) publicizing the FAP to physicians and 
community health centers in the community; (9) including information regarding the FAP in 
hospital newsletters or magazines; (10) including information regarding the FAP in appropriate 
reports filed with state governments; (11) publicizing the FAP through local news media and/or 
(12) publicizing the FAP through social service agencies.” Id. at 38152. 
 242. Id. at 38154. 
 243. See Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill: Uninsured Patients Often Face Big 
Markups on Small Items; ‘Rules Are Completely Crazy’, WALL ST. J., September 21, 2004, at 
B.1 (chronicling the financial difficulties of an uninsured patient with high hospital bills who was 
unable to pay, highlighting the fact that patients who cannot pay the high medical bills initially 
will be unable to pay them in the future). 
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the indigent patient could afford.244 Thus, it was in the hospital’s interest to 
charge indigent patients the gross charges for services. 
Hospital chargemasters are the gross charges for medical services,245 
and are often set high with the understanding that private insurers will 
negotiate rates below the chargemaster rates.246 Thus, hospitals set these 
prices intentionally high understanding they will receive an amount 
somewhere below this set amount for the majority of their target customers – 
patients covered under health insurance.247 Under new § 501(r)(5), hospitals 
are limited to charging FAP-eligibles the AGB, which is an aggregate 
calculation of all private insurance rates negotiated at the facility and 
Medicare Part A payments.248 Section 501(r)(5) certainly brings change to 
this area in that hospitals are no longer able to bill FAP-eligible patients the 
chargemaster rate,249 but FAP-eligible patients are potentially subject to be 
charged the “AGB percentage,”250 which is an amount that neither privately 
insured patients nor Medicare patients actually pay out-of-pocket once their 
deductible is met.251 Privately insured and Medicare patients will pay some 
percentage below the amounts billed to their insurers,252 yet § 501(r) still 
permits hospitals to charge FAP-eligibles the whole amount of the AGB,253 
potentially placing them above all patients in terms of the amount 
responsible for payment.254 
 
 244. See Jenny Gold, New Rules Will Ban Debt Collections at Charitable Hospitals, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Jun. 27, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/june/27/er-debt 
-charity-hospitals.aspx. 
 245. Reinhardt, supra note 229, at 58, 59. 
 246. Id. at 61. See also Gerard F. Anderson, From ‘Soak the Rich’ to ‘Soak the Poor’: 
Recent Trends in Hospital Pricing, 26 HEALTH AFF. 780, 784 (2007). 
 247. Reinhardt, supra note 229, at 61. 
 248. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38153-55. This is 
assuming hospitals will opt for the “look-back” method, which permits higher patients under the 
facility’s FAP. Id. at 38154-55. 
 249. Id. at 38155. 
 250. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38153. This is 
assuming hospitals will opt for the “look-back” method, which most certainly will as it allows 
them to charge higher amounts to FAP-eligible patients. 
 251. Christopher P. Tompkins et al., The Precarious Pricing System for Hospital Services, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 45, 52 (2006). 
 252. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE: A PRIMER 1, 12 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-03.pdf. See also Lagnado, supra note 243. 
 253. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38153-55. 
 254. See generally id. at 38154-55 (discussing the “look-back” method for determining 
amounts generally billed). See also Reinhardt, supra note 229, at 62. Consider an example 
where a hospital chooses the “look-back” method to calculate its “amounts generally billed” 
to calculate the charges to FAP-eligible patients. Prior to the § 501(r)(5) limitations on 
charges, hospitals would have been able to charge their “gross charges,” and let us assume 
this figure is $1,000 for this procedure. However, under the “look-back” method, the hospital 
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The above analysis undermines the assertion that § 501(r) brings 
meaningful change to limitations on charges, and this is supported by the 
legislative history of ACA § 9007. As amended in December 2009, the term 
“amounts generally billed” replaced “the lowest amounts charged” 
language in § 501(r)(5) as originally introduced by the Senate version of 
healthcare reform.255 The “lowest amounts charged” language would have 
forced hospitals to charge FAP-eligibles the lowermost negotiated rates for 
health insurance companies,256 and would have supported a stronger 
argument that § 501(r) brings meaningful change to the community benefit 
standard, as envisioned by Professors Berg and Colombo in their writings on 
the topic.257 However, by replacing the relatively strong language with 
“amounts generally billed,” Congress introduced a standard more open to 
interpretation by hospitals setting AGB-percentages for FAP-eligibles,258 and 
introducing another somewhat cloudy variable. Again, the immediately 
preceding analysis points to the fact that § 501(r)(5), similar to the CHNA 
analyzed under Professor Berg’s framework and the FAP/EMC requirements, 
are truly nothing more than hollow requirements for charitable hospitals. 
C. Billing and Collections & Extraordinary Collection Actions, § 501(r)(6) 
The last portion of §501(r) of the Code relates to the ultimate step for 
tax-exempt healthcare entities attempting to collect nonpayment from a FAP-
eligible individual in §501(r)(6) for billings and collections.259 It embodies 
guidance for “reasonable efforts” to determine whether a patient is FAP-
eligible and a prohibition from engaging in ECAs against the patient,260 any 
 
determines that it charges Health Insurers A, B and C, $500, $540, and $450, respectively, 
under the negotiated rates. In addition, the charge under Medicare is $400. Thus, the AGB 
would be calculated as ($500 + $540 + $450 + $400) / 4 = $472.50, which is the 
amount charged to FAP-eligible individuals. Therefore, under the limitations on charges to the 
“amounts generally billed” hospitals are permitted to charge FAP-eligible individuals $472.50 
under the above example, which is far below the $1,000 charge prior to reform, yet it would 
still place FAP eligible patients above Medicare and privately insured patients in terms of 
actual out-of-pocket costs. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 38153 (providing examples of how hospitals may comply with the limitations on 
charges). However, it should also be noted that hospitals are permitted to provide discounts 
larger than the “amounts generally billed.” See id. at 38162 (proposing a hypothetical 
hospital’s FAP under the look-back method). 
 255. 111 CONG. REC. S13,527 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2009). 
 256. 111 CONG. REC. S11,808 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2009). 
 257. See Berg, supra note 4, at 412; Colombo, supra note 2, at 58. 
 258. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38165 (noting 
that hospitals are permitted to calculate the limitations on charges by utilizing the “amounts 
generally billed”). 
 259. Id. at 38152. 
 260. Id. 
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individual responsible for payment of the patient’s debt, and imposes 
liability on any hospital whose third-party collection agency engages in 
ECAs.261 
Considering the previous analysis, the prohibitions on billings and 
collections is likely the most beneficial component of § 501(r) for patients, 
as it severely limits the ability of hospitals to pursue outstanding bad debts 
against certain patients.262 Under closer scrutiny, the limitations of § 
 
 261. Id. at 38158-59. Under the proposed regulations, ECAs are any action that 
“require[s] a legal or judicial process” and include, but are not limited to “(1) plac[ing] a lien 
on an individual’s property; (2) foreclos[ing] on an individual’s real property; (3) 
commenc[ing] a civil action against an individual; (4) caus[ing] an individual’s arrest; (5) 
caus[ing] an individual to be subject to a writ of body attachment; and (6) garnish[ing] an 
individual’s wages.” Id. at 38156. In addition to the steps, which require legal or judicial 
processes, the IRS also proposed that reporting adverse information to a credit agency is also 
considered an ECA. Id. The common practice of selling a patient’s debt to a collections 
agency is classified as an ECA under the proposed rules, but they specifically note assigning a 
patient’s debt to a third party is not considered an ECA. Id. The proposed regulations note 
that the hospital may maintain greater control over a third-party agent and contractually 
prohibit the agent from engaging in ECAs against the patient, or potentially subject the 
hospital to liability. Id. 
 262. See id. at 38155 (discussing traditional actions taken by hospitals in order to collect 
debts, and the limitations on these actions by the new regulations). This practice elicited a 
scathing comment from Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson in response to the 
proposed regulations highlighting the collection practices of a Chicago-based company hired 
to manage “revenue cycles” of some Minnesota hospitals. Letter from Lori Swanson, 
Minnesota Attorney General, to the Dept. of Treas. 4 (Sept. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=IRS-2012-0036-0211. Ms. Swanson’s 
comment in response to the proposed regulations highlighted egregious actions from the 
Chicago-based company where they elicited payments from individuals in vulnerable 
situations. “Patients were asked to pay money in the emergency room while suffering from 
chest pain, strokes, blood clots, labored breathing, suicide attempts, diabetic attacks, elevated 
heart rates, elevated blood pressure, acute pain, kidney stone attacks, disorientation, mental 
confusion, and while hemorrhaging blood. Some patients were asked to pay money while in 
so much pain they thought they were dying. Others were asked to pay money while dazed and 
disoriented. Some were asked to pay money while hooked up to morphine drips, heart 
monitors, IVs, or with tubes down their throat. Many were laying undressed on a gurney when 
the collector visited their bedside. Some had not yet seen a doctor. Some had not been 
treated. Some were forced to haggle in their ER bed over their ability or need to pay the bill.” 
Id. Ms. Swanson’s comment continued to highlight specific instances of the “revenue cycle” 
management company: “(1) A woman suffering a stroke caused by a blood clot in her brain 
was asked to pay money at her bedside in the ER before she had been stabilized. (2) The 
mother of a teenage daughter who had tried to overdose on a bottle of pills was made to pay 
$500 in the middle of the night before she could return to her daughter’s bedside. (3) A 
pregnant mother was made to pay money while she was bleeding and in the midst of 
miscarrying her first baby.” Id. The Attorney General’s Office filed a lawsuit against the 
Chicago-based company in January 2012. Id. at 3. The lawsuit was filed as a result of some 
rather unusual circumstances. See also Press Release, The Office of the Attorney General Lori 
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501(r)(6) are revealed when considering its relationship to a facility’s FAP.263 
As revealed in the FAP/EMC section above, a hospital is permitted to create 
its own FAP, as long as it meets certain requirements set forth in the 
proposed regulations,264 and ECAs defined in the footnotes are prohibited if 
it is revealed that the patient qualifies for the facility’s FAP.265 But a glaring 
criticism of this standard is that ECAs are prohibited against FAP-eligibles,266 
and the definition of a FAP-eligible patient is defined by the hospital.267 
Thus, the potential volume of ECAs pursued by a facility will be largely 
determined by that facility,268 again undermining what could have been 
meaningful community benefit reform under § 501(r). 
VI.  DISCUSSION & SOLUTION 
Under Professor Berg’s framework and the additional analysis of § 
501(r), the community benefit reform under the ACA’s changes to 
community benefit are somewhat lacking in their long awaited change in 
this arena of healthcare.269 CHNA outcome comparisons based on 
Schedule H information will likely prove difficult to quantify and compare, as 
illustrated by Professor Berg’s acknowledgement of the difficulty measuring 
outcomes for public health initiatives.270 And perhaps the most inefficient 
provision of the additions is the $50,000 excise tax imposed on healthcare 
organizations who fail to comply with CHNA requirements and its impact on 
 
Swanson, Attorney General Swanson Sues Accretive Health for Patient Privacy Violations (Jan. 
19, 2012), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/120119Accretive 
Health.asp. The Chicago Company announced in early 2013 that it would no longer pursue 
bad debts older than one year, but that it would still pursue collections from patients at the 
time of treatment. Andrew L. Wang, Accretive Mulls Paring Back Debt Collection Practices, 
CHICAGO HEALTH CARE DAILY (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20130 
117/NEWS03/130119810/accretive-mulls-paring-back-debt-collection-practices. The 
company settled the lawsuit filed by Ms. Swanson, agreeing to pay patients $2.5 million, and 
agreeing to not operate in Minnesota for two years. Id. 
 263. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38155 (noting 
that hospitals are prohibited from engaging in ECAs against those who qualify for the facility’s 
FAP). 
 264. Id. at 38151. 
 265. Id. at 38155. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. at 38151 (noting that under the proposed regulations, hospital facilities are 
entitled to define which patients will qualify under their FAP). 
 268. See Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 38155-59 
(noting that hospitals may define their financial assistance policy, and the limitation of ECAs is 
only defined to those who qualify for the financial assistance policy, showing that the practice 
may have the opportunity for abuse). 
 269. See Berg, supra note 4, at 402-21 (describing the five components of Professor 
Berg’s framework). 
 270. Id. at 387. 
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rural community hospitals that traditionally operate on low profit margins.271 
These shortcomings, among many others, support the assertion that § 501(r) 
is nothing more than a sheep in wolves clothing, masquerading as 
meaningful reform but simply presenting an illusion until subject to close 
scrutiny. 
Ultimately, is our infatuation with the community benefit standard 
holding not-for-profit tax-exempt charitable hospitals to the lofty, albeit stale 
ideals of a bygone era?272 Are the familiar criticisms that community benefit 
does not go “far enough” or that we need something more, simply a 
reflection on society’s unwillingness to acknowledge that the not-for-profit 
hospital is not what we think it is?273 Perhaps yes, but ultimately the § 501(r) 
changes are not the solution to the problems plaguing community benefit. 
However, a glimmer of hope to right the community benefit wrongs is buried 
in the ACA tax-exempt hospital reform, even though it misses the mark on a 
majority of its provisions. Collaboration between the IRS and HHS was a 
suggestion offered by academics in the 1990s,274 and it is likely that this 
collaboration is finally what community benefit needs to overcome its 
limitations and become a viable standard for federal tax-exemption. Yet, 
despite this much needed collaboration between IRS and other agencies, § 
501(r) does not fulfill the meaningful reform under Professor Berg’s analysis 
and only brings superficial change to an area rife with complication. In the 
end, § 501(r) is just community benefit redux – the resurgence of a familiar 
standard. 
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